FIELD MANUAL No. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Section V – AirLand Battle and Counterguerrilla Operations. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Counterguerilla Operations FM MCRP a [Department of Defense, Taylor Anderson] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The

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These may include specific limitations regarding the use of firepower and types of weapons, or they may be general regarding the relationship of the counterguerrilla force with the civilian population.

The commander of a counterguerrilla force in a conventional conflict plans his operations by analyzing the factors of METT-T. Some of these factors include the force composition, aviation assets, fire support assets, mobility, equipment, and size of the counterguerrilla opeations.

An insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by an internal attempt, countergurerilla assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government.

The basic philosophy of rear counterguefrilla doctrine is to maximize the capability of combat support and combat service support elements to defend operrations and render mutual support without requiring assistance from tactical combat forces. This concept applies to an organized insurgent movement that seeks to overthrow the established government.

There can be no revolution without a resistance movement, but there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when the objectives of the resistors do not envision a reallocation of power. Usually, this type of population is found when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate areas opposed to the goals of the enemy force.

The counterguerrilla force commander must realize that destruction of numerous insignificant targets may cause more damage and confusion than the destruction or damage of one important target.

As with political factors, social factors are considered, but their impact is usually reduced.

FM Chptr 4 Counterguerrilla Operations In Conventional Conflicts

A cold climate usually favors the counterguerrilla force and hampers guerrilla operations since it increases the logistics required to support the guerrilla. In this situation, the guerrilla force may be receiving some support from the populace. In addition, the counterguerrilla force maximizes all information that can be gained from tactical operations to locate the guerrilla force.


Usually, the indigenous guerrilla force must rely on external support for its logistics requirements. US forces must, in all cases, treat the civilian populace in a fair and just manner whether the people support the US presence or not. Effective use of populace and resources control operations and psychological operations can reduce the logistical support received through the populace.

If it continues to operate within the area that can be influenced by the main enemy forces, or if it utilizes conventional tactics, then it is not considered a guerrilla force. Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German lines during World War II are discussed in Chapter 4.

Unconventional warface forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare consist of special units trained specifically for guerrilla warfare and indigenous guerrilla forces sponsored by the main enemy force.

U.S. Army Counterguerrilla Operations Manual

The counterguerrilla force commander may or may countergjerrilla have control over all forces in the rear area for employment coubterguerrilla rear battle operations. They may also be skilled in and use overland and waterborne both surface and subsurface techniques to coounterguerrilla the area.

It is analyzed counerguerrilla terms of its effect on men and equipment, trafficability, and visibility. The counterguerrilla force commander will be provided guidelines and directives on the current joint and combined procedures for establishing an effective rear defense. However, if it does exist, it normally occurs in support of enemy forces engaged in conventional combat with friendly forces and occurs in the friendly force rear areas.

He will effect liaison with all forces operating in his area of responsibility, fix specific responsibilities, and exercise overall control of defensive operations in response to a guerrilla threat. Generally, the relationship between the counterguerrilla force and the civilian population is governed by restrictions and agreements that the US has with the government s of the country or countries in which the conflict takes place.

For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. A population that actively supports the counterguerrilla force greatly enhances the capability to detect guerrilla forces. Usually, when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate previously captured friendly opetations, the sociological factors generally favor the counterguerrilla force.


Often, the guerrilla strikes in this manner to gain the advantage of surprise. Lack of government control may be real or perceived. FM Download File – 1. Because of the capability of NBC weapons to cause a maximum amount of confusion with counterguerrklla limited amount of operayions, their use must be considered as a method that the guerrilla may employ. To be successful in countering this type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations must understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he operates.

The guerrilla force seeks to disrupt command, control, communications, and logistics operations and facilities. Coungerguerrilla all instances, it is imperative that the principle of unity of command be maintained to minimize confusion and indecision that will occur if there is an inability to determine who is in command.

The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent strategy.

In addition, the commander may have allied regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces under his control in certain situations. These operation include reconnaissance patrols, ambushes, attacks, encirclements, and movements to contact.

The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit dissatisfaction with the current government.

What may be the least likely course of action for a conventional force may be the most likely for the guerrilla force. These actions may be conducted by conventional or unconventional forces utilizing guerrilla warfare tactics. That situation may occur when US forces operate in captured enemy territory. For further information on rear area operations, see FM Forces he may have might include combat, combat support, and combat service support couhterguerrilla.

Offensive and defensive techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. The techniques used by these forces usually consist of raids and ambushes.